In relation to
the semantic operator matter/idea, my concern is with the old ontological
assumptions that are inherited and assumed unnoticed in its use, its implicit reifications. Physics does
not speak anymore about matter. Fermions, the particles which are thought to be
matter-like (in opposition to the
force carrier bosons) make only sense within the whole system, which implies
that matter is not material in the traditional sense, but some sort of symbolic
construction that we use to understand an apeironic experience. For instance
the Weyl-fermions are massless, which means a massless matter, if such an
expression has any meaning at all. In this sense is very different to old
Greco-Roman atomic constructions. And things do not get any better if we try to
switch the matter representation for the concept of energy. According to Maxwell’s
definition: energy is the capacity of a system to perform mechanical work (1891),
but in order for the definition to have any meaning we already have to know the
concepts of system and mechanical work (and its associated
intuitions), we need a Lebenswelt praxis to construct upon.
Psychology, on
the other hand is showing that ideas are not independent of the vital process
(unless we assume them a priori to be so), and that even perception is
conditioned by emotional valuations, id est, the relation object/subject is
more complex than it was thought to be, I would say mimetic. The reference for
matter and idea is mind, but mind is not an exomorphic representation, for we
can think it in terms of life processes, and for those processes we can take as
an anthropological departing point the system of mythical interpretation with
its economical and primitive determinations (as I have explained these concepts
in Mythopoetics). In this sense ideas are determined not only by Lebenswelt butalso by what we could call Unterlebenswelt, valuations on a physiological levelprior to the symbolizations of human language. My opinion is that we need some
sort of metaphilosophical system to encompass such a wide and complex scope of
conceptualizations that independent sciences cannot think. It does not have to
be reductionistic, neither depart from a unique ontoepistemology but simply
define a basic framework for the treatment of the emergence of all these new
complex relations, in myths harmonized with our ways of life.
It is not so
much that matter has become more ideal and ideas more material, as a question
of the obsolescence of the old semantic dual operator.
Comments
Post a Comment
Please write here your comments