Knowledge is an endomorphic fuzzy representation of the state of a system

As expressed in another entry:

"The world of the life of a historical community, the Lebenswelt (L) (in Habermas’ [2010] sense of the concept) is in a close connection with the realm of experience that today is under the scrutiny of life sciences. In the philosophical milieu, one is spontaneously drawn to consider such a realm exclusively under the scope of contemporary science, and therefore, systematically, but if we want to elucidate the concept of system, we should proceed more carefully, for the semantical actions which lead us to distinguish something as a system are conditioned by some automatic psycho-biological protocols which belong to a different realm, let us call it Unterlebenswelt (U). The acritical knowledge which constitute the communicative actions of L is the result of an evolutive process of communication and complexification which started beyond human grounds, in the communicative actions of U. Since communication is a social homeostatic tool, the basic semantics of L are predetermined in the emotional protocols[7] of U which enable the acritical character of the linguistic actions of L. In this sense, L and U define a socio-biological space without which the choices and distinctions which make something to be a system could never be understood. L-U, considered as symbolic actions of homeostatic valuation, are not only the conditions for the formalized symbolic constructions of science, but they are as well the linguistic core of social identity which renders scientific activity meaningful. Nonetheless, the formalized symbolic constructions of science are in turn conditions for those very same choices of the socio-biological space of L-U, in fact, we are talking of a three dimensional space U-L-Ü (calling Überlebenswelt the formalized linguistic constructions of science) for the constitution of the unifying cognitive principle from which we construct the concept of system.

In this sense, an exclusively mathematical characterization of the concept of system seems insufficient and the definitions carry some serious ontoepistemological problems that can heavily weigh upon the praxis of systems science. "

When we talk about knowledge we imply knowledge of an U-L-Ü system, and we mean the ability to form an endomorphic representation of such a system. Since U-L-Ü systems are necessary fuzzy, our knowledge representations express more or less fuzzy expressions of a particular state of the system. In this sense, the different between knowledge and opinion is a matter of degree of fuzziness, and not just a question of truth functions. Such representations can never be a subset of the system for the U-L part of the system operates with poorly defined sets or with manifolds that cannot be defined according to cleat properties.